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ARTICLE
THE FOLLY OF REQUIRING COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.†
Some criminal law axioms represent moral judgments. A classic example
is William Blackstone’s adage that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape,
than that one innocent suffer.”1 That proposition does not represent an
empirically proven conclusion. Blackstone did not make that claim, no one
has proved it since then, the variables are too numerous for any attempt to
be successful, and there are too many counterexamples for any proof to be
persuasive. (What if among the ten guilty persons are Ted Bundy, Jeffrey
Dahmer, John Wayne Gacy, Timothy McVeigh, and Usama bin Laden?)
By contrast, at one time the principle that “Everyone is presumed to
know the law,” which is more a rule of law than a presumption,2 did
represent the actual state of affairs. There were a limited number of crimes
at common law, and they were obvious to everyone given their violent
nature (murder, rape, and robbery) or religious underpinnings
(blasphemy).3 The colonies brought the common law of crimes to American

† John, Barbara, and Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation; M.P.P., George Washington University, 2012; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1980;
B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1977. I want to thank Rachel E. Barkow, John Malcolm,
Clare Myers, and Mark Osler for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this
Article. Clare Myers also provided invaluable research assistance. Any errors are mine.
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432, 456 (1895) (embracing Blackstone’s maxim).
2. See Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110, 119-21 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that an irrebutable presumption is properly treated as a rule of law); 5 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW 453-54 (2d ed. 1923).
3. There were only eight original common law felonies: treason, murder,
manslaughter, rape, robbery, sodomy, burglary, larceny, and arson. Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Mistakes and Justice—Using the Pardon Power to Remedy a Mistake of Law, 15 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 651, 666 n.76 (2017); see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 442-62 (5th ed. 1956) (discussing the origin and development of the common
law crimes). The common law courts added new ones over time. See, e.g., JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 53 (2d ed. 1960); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
78-80 (5th ed. 2010); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 6869 (1933); see generally 1-3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND (1883).
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soil,4 and the first federal criminal statute contained approximately thirty
offenses.5 Everyone would have known where to find the line between legal
and illegal conduct.
Today, however, it makes sense to treat that presumption of knowledge
only as a rebuttable presumption—that is, the starting point for an inquiry
into what someone knew or could be expected to know. The reason is that
the small codes of yesteryear have gone the way of buggy whips and slide
rules. Today, there are thousands of federal and state criminal offenses
spread over the fifty-one titles and 27,000 pages of the U.S. Code and the
fifty parallel versions in the states.6 Aside from addressing new ways that
man has discovered to make life unpleasant for his neighbor (kidnapping,
drug trafficking, and so forth), Congress and the state legislatures decided
to use the criminal law to enforce numerous rules made necessary by the
transformation of America from the rural, agricultural society lauded by
Thomas Jefferson7 into the urban, industrialized society faced by President
Benjamin Harrison and his successors.8 The result is that, in some unknown
number of cases, the aphorism “Everyone is presumed to know the law”
should be rewritten as “Everyone is presumed to know some of the law.” So

4. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2133 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“Edward Coke[’s]
. . . Institutes ‘were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of law . . . .”’)
(citation omitted); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (noting that the
“descendants of Englishmen . . . inherited the traditions of the English law and history . . . .”);
Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1910).
Eleven colonies enacted “receiving statutes,” which incorporated the common law as state
law. New Jersey adopted the common law through its state constitution; Connecticut, by
judicial decision. English common law remained colonial law until replaced by an act of the
colonial legislature. See, e.g., MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 8 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 18-20 (1975)).
5. See An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, 1 STAT.
112 (1790). The act made it a crime to interfere with functions of the new government, such
as treason, misprision of treason, perjury in federal court, bribery of federal judges, and
forgery of federal certificates or securities. It also outlawed common law crimes with a
connection to federal property or particular federal interests, such as murder, robbery,
larceny, and receipt of stolen property on federal land or on the high seas.
6. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory & Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 715, 726-27 (2013) (hereafter Larkin, Public Choice); Ellen S. Podgor,
Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005).
7. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Penguin Classics 1998)
(1st ed. 1781).
8. See THOMAS C. MCCRAW, AMERICAN BUSINESS SINCE 1920: HOW IT WORKED (3d ed.
2018); GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860-1920 (2006).
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revised, the maxim becomes a more humble rebuttable presumption than
an audacious across-the-board rule.
It is the burden of this Article to persuade the reader of that proposition.
The argument below proceeds in five steps. Part I argues that elementary
principles of criminal and constitutional law require the government to
identify the line between lawful and unlawful conduct. Part II explains that
the standard for deciding whether the population has been adequately
informed is whether a “person of ordinary intelligence” or the “average
person” would know what the law forbids. Part III shifts from normative
and legal to empirical and practical considerations. It maintains that there is
too much criminal law for the average person to know its entirety,
particularly when you move beyond physically harmful, dangerous, and
immoral conduct—conduct that the common law deemed malum in se or
inherently evil—to crimes that exist only because a legislature or regulatory
agency decided to invoke the criminal law as an enforcement tool—conduct
known as malum prohibitum or conduct that is a crime only because the
democratic process has so labeled it. Part IV then takes the position that it is
a mistake to assume that the person of ordinary intelligence can acquire
complete knowledge of the criminal law by informally learning community
social mores. Part V suggests how we can remedy this problem. This Article
then concludes by asking for honesty from courts confronted by a
defendant’s legitimate claim that no reasonable person would have known
that what was charged against him is a crime.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF ANY CRIMINAL CODE:
IT MUST BE UNDERSTANDABLE
It is not often that we need to identify the fundamental principles
underlying the criminal law. Only a political revolutionary, a member of the
American Law Institute, or a law professor (or perhaps all three) could
propose that we ditch the entire corpus of federal and state criminal law
that has developed over the last millennium and adopt an entirely new
criminal code. Legislators, judges, and scholars ordinarily content
themselves with merely making revisions around the edges in order to
improve the criminal law in the same type of slow and steady manner that
enabled the tortoise to beat the hare. Of course, every now and then some
people have the chance to wipe the slate clean and start anew. The first state
officials elected after the Declaration of Independence was signed, the
Framers of our Constitution, and the members of the First Congress were in
that position long ago. Yet, even they generally left in place the common law

338

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:335

of crimes that they brought with them from England, at least how it stood
in 1776.9
Nonetheless, every now and then a criminal code becomes so
voluminous and encrusted with barnacles from years of revisions and
additions that scholars, judges, and legislators decide to start over rather
than revise the existing code. The American Law Institute took up that
project in the 1950s and published its Model Penal Code fifty-six years ago
in an effort to organize and modernize criminal law.10 Although that
attempt failed to generate the critical mass necessary to become legislation
nationwide, some members of Congress have recently taken up the chore of
devising a new federal criminal code. Representative James Sensenbrenner,
for example, has called the federal criminal code “a mess”11 and sponsored
legislation that would have replaced federal penal law, Title 18 of the U.S.
Code. Former senior Department of Justice officials, the American Bar
Association, and various scholars have urged Congress and the states to
reform the criminal law.12 Perhaps, that rough beast’s hour has come round
at last.13
Suppose that Congress and the Council of State Governments decided to
commission someone to prepare a Model Penal Code 2.0 and selected a
reporter for that task. Let’s call her Doris, after the wife of Herbert

9. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2133 (2015) (plurality opinion); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); see Herbert
Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1952).
11. See Criminal Code Reform: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of
2014 on the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1-3 (2014) (Prepared Statement of Rep.
F. James Sensenbrenner, Over-Criminalization Task Force) (“The federal Criminal Code is a
mess. Rather than a well-organized, systemic tool for enforcing important Federal criminal
statutes, the Code is riddled with provisions that are outdated, redundant, or simply
inconsistent with more recent modifications to reflect today’s modern approach to criminal
law. This is due, at least in part, to Congress’s penchant for legislating in a vacuum, in a
politically popular manner, or in rapid response to a crisis or national news story, instead of
thoughtfully and deliberately. The resulting Code is a vast, chaotic, disorganized
amalgamation of criminal statutes that is difficult to use for practitioners and nearly
incomprehensible to the average American. The size and disorganization makes it
extraordinarily difficult to ferret out the law applicable to a particular factual situation, which
does a great disservice to the public.”).
12. See Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 6, at 720–21 & nn.16–20 (collecting
authorities).
13. See W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming (1919), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF W.B.
YEATS: THE POEMS 189, 190 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1997) (“And what rough beast, its hour
come round at last / Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?”).
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Wechsler, the chief reporter on the ALI’s 1962 effort.14 The content of what
she ultimately would have prepared doubtless would be the subject of an
interesting debate. For purposes of this Article, however, what is most
important is how she would have begun her task. Before deciding what to
specifically outlaw, Doris likely would start by identifying what, if any,
principles should serve as the foundation for her code. It is likely that Doris
would have started with two elementary principles.
The first one would be that there must be a law that a person can be said
to have violated. That principle is called the “Rule of Legality,” but also is
known by the Latin phrases “[N]ullum crimen sine lege” (“There is no crime
absent a written law”) and “[N]ulla poena sine lege” (“There is no penalty
absent a written law”).15 Perhaps an axiom of the criminal law in every
Western nation, the Rule of Legality has been described as one of the most
“widely held value-judgment[s] in the entire history of human thought.”16
That rule reflects the principle that, for a criminal justice system to be
deemed just, a person must be able to avoid committing an act that renders
him liable for criminal punishment.17 Otherwise, the criminal law could
become a weapon of oppression rather than a means of promoting social
order and would fall somewhere along the spectrum between the fictional
system that Shirley Jackson created in The Lottery18 and the real-life systems
that some of history’s despots actually applied.19 No one would characterize
any such system as just. Accordingly, to Professor George Fletcher, “We
start with the assumption that a just conviction presupposes that the actor

14. Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/28/us/herbert-wechsler-legal-giant-is-dead-at90.html.
15. Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1937). Closely related to
the Rule of Legality are the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §
9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1. The Framers recognized that the Rule of Legality is fundamental by
prohibiting the federal and state governments from applying a new criminal law
retroactively.
16. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1960).
17. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 15, at 165, 178; Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 726 (2012).
18. See Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, THE NEW YORKER (June 26, 1948),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1948/06/26/the-lottery.
19. See, e.g., THOMAS PITT TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 67
(2012) (“In disposition and character John was an oriental despot, a tyrant of the worst sort .
. . . He was guilty of acts of cruelty rivaling those of Nero.”) (footnote omitted).
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had a fair chance of avoiding his act of wrongdoing or his violation of a
statute.”20
The second principle follows from the first one: the criminal law must be
understandable.21 The reason is simple: having a criminal law that no one
can understand is tantamount to having no law at all.22 Several ancillary
propositions follow from that one. For example, a criminal law must be
publicly available so that people can read it. Legislatures cannot lock it away
or put it in an inaccessible location.23 In fact, Article I of the Constitution
requires Congress to publish all federal criminal laws,24 and the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause imposes the same obligation on the

20. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 731 (1978); see also HERBERT PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 68 (1968) (“People ought in general to be able to plan
their conduct with some assurance that they can avoid entanglement with the criminal law;
by the same token the enforcers and appliers of the law should not waste their time lurking
in the bushes ready to trap the offender who is unaware that he is offending. It is precisely
the fact that in its normal and characteristic operation the criminal law provides this
opportunity and this protection to people in their everyday lives that makes it a tolerable
institution in a free society. Take this away, and the criminal law ceases to be a guide to the
well-intentioned and a restriction on the restraining power of the state.”); cf. H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28-53 (2d ed. 2008) (offering that rationale as the
justification for recognizing excuses to crimes).
21. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the
Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 381-86
(2015) (hereafter Larkin, Dynamic Incorporation).
22. Cf. Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better
Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 204 (1934) (lamenting the
difficulty in finding an agency rule before the Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. § 1501
(2012), required their publication).
23. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“To enforce
such a [vague] statute would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula who ‘published the
law, but it was written in a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could
make a copy of it.'”); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS 547 (1843) (“We hear of tyrants, and those
cruel ones: but, whatever we may have felt, we have never heard of any tyrant in such sort
cruel, as to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from the
knowledge of.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *46 (noting that Caligula “wrote his laws in
a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare
the people.”); Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 641, 650 n.39 (1941) (“[W]here the law was not available to the community, the
principle of ‘nulla poena sine lege’ comes into play . . . .”).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy . . . .”).
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states.25 Moreover, published criminal laws must be written in English, the
mother tongue in this nation.26 That leaves out Latin, Hausa, Pashtu,
Sinhalese, Tagalog, or Urdu, even French or Spanish, as well as Morse code,
semaphore, smoke signals, or a computer code series of 0s and 1s.
Jabberwocky also doesn’t cut it.27
Of course, even an accessible criminal law written in English is
inadequate if its terms are so vague that no one can readily understand what
they mean. There is even a well-settled criminal and constitutional law
doctrine establishing that principle, known as the “Void-for-Vagueness”
Doctrine.28 According to that doctrine, a criminal law must fairly tell the
public exactly what is a crime, and a statute so vague that a person can only
guess as to its meaning cannot be used as a criminal law.29 At bottom, the
principle is that vague laws are little better than having no law at all.30 As the
25. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001) (quoting Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964)) (reiterating “the ‘basic principle that a criminal statute
must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime’”); id. at 459 (reiterating the
“core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair
warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to
what previously had been innocent conduct”).
26. Larkin, Dynamic Incorporation, supra note 21, at 387-88.
27. Id.; Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 (1930) (“A
statute made in Latin at the present time is no statute, although the intention of the
legislature can be as well or as ill made out from Latin as from English.”).
28. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (discussing the historical development of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine); Meese & Larkin, supra note 17, at 761; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The
Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U.L. REV. 293, 307–08 (2016) (hereafter Larkin, Lost
Due Process Doctrines).
29. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“A
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”).
30. Vague criminal laws are problematic for several reasons. See Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (“First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related,
where a vague statute ‘abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it
‘operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden
areas were clearly marked.’”).
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Supreme Court explained in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, “No one may be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids.”31 That is why no legislature can make it a crime to
do “bad things” and leave it to courts to flesh out that term on a case-bycase basis.32
II. THE STANDARD FOR MEASURING UNDERSTANDABILITY:
WHAT A “PERSON OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE” WOULD UNDERSTAND
Once Doris realized that the criminal code must be understandable, she
would have turned to the question of what standard she should use to
analyze a statute. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, she would have
realized, identifies the standard that a court must use when deciding
whether a criminal law is sufficiently clear. The issue in every vagueness
case is how an average person would understand a statute. As the Court
explained in an early application of this doctrine, “a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application violates the first essential of due process of law.”33 Put
differently (and in a gender neutral fashion), “[t]he constitutional
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his [or her] contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute.”34 A “person of ordinary intelligence,” a
“person of common intelligence,” “the common world”—those are the
phrases that the Supreme Court has used to describe how to decide whether
a statute is understandable. The Court has used that standard when it has
upheld criminal laws over vagueness challenges and when it has held them
unconstitutional.35
31. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
32. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding unconstitutionally vague
a local ordinance making it unlawful to act “in a manner annoying to” passersby).
33. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (emphasis added).
34. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (emphasis added; footnote
omitted).
35. For cases rejecting void-for-vagueness challenges to legislation, see, e.g., Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 456 (1991) (“mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount” of a controlled substance); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 90 (1975) (“other
firearms capable of being concealed on the person”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
547 (1975) (“Indian country”); Roth v. United States, 354, 479–80 U.S. 476 (1957)
(“obscenity”); United States v. Korpan, 354 U.S. 271, 274 (1957) (“so-called ‘slot’ machine”);
United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 593 (1952) (“timely application in good faith” for
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departure documents from United States); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 614 (1954)
(“receiving any contributions or expending any money” to influence the passage or defeat of
federal legislation); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 339 (1952) (“so
far as practicable”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 224 (1951) (“crime involving moral
turpitude”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 496 (1951) (advocating the “propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence”); Cole
v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345, 348 (1949) (a person acting in concert with others “to assemble at
or near any place where a ‘labor dispute’ exists”); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 3
(1947) (“in excess of the number of employees needed”); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
93 (1945) (“rights, privileges, or immunities . . . protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States”); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 517 (1942) (“reasonable allowance”);
Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 21 (1941) (“connected with the national defense”);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109 n.1 (1941) (“industries engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce”); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270, 271, 273 (1940) (“psychopathic personality” as shown by “habitual course of
misconduct in sexual matters” demonstrating “an utter lack of power to control their sexual
impulses'” and a likelihood “to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on
the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire”); Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1
(1938) (permitting only “ordinary charges authorized and required by the Corporation for
services actually rendered for examination and perfecting of title, appraisal, and like
necessary services”); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 255 (1937) (“at any time”); Old
Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 185 (1936) (“fair and open
competition”); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 381 (1932) (“shortest practicable route”);
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930) (to solicit or receive “any . . .
contribution for any political purpose whatever”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 359
(1927) (“criminal syndicalism”); Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328, 330 (1927) (same
phrase “criminal syndicalism”); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266 (1927) (“[w]hoever
shall build a fire in or near any forest, timber, or other inflammable material upon the public
domain”); Miller v. Oregon, 273 U.S. 657 (1927) aff’g 119 Or. 409 (1926) (involuntary
manslaughter conviction for doing a lawful act “without due caution or circumspection”);
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 249 (1922) (“unjust and unreasonable” or
“oppressive” rent); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 345 n.4 (1918) (grazing sheep on
any cattle range “usually occupied by any cattle grower”); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273,
275 (1915) (any written matter “having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission of
any crime, breach of the peace, or act of violence, or which shall tend to encourage or
advocate disrespect for law”); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (antitrust rule of
reason).
For cases holding statutes unconstitutionally vague, see, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012) (“indecent” broadcast); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
45 (1999) (“criminal street gang”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Smith v. Gogen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (“vagrant”); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
(“annoying” public passersby); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965)
(“loitering”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (“sacrilegious”); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 513 (1948) (“so massed as to become vehicles for inciting”);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (“loiter”); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 452
(1939) (“[a]ny person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of a
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Who is the typical “person of ordinary intelligence”? Like the “reasonable
person” used in tort law when defining negligence, a “person of ordinary
intelligence” is a legal construct, an ideal, not a particular individual. The
Supreme Court has not defined the criteria that a court must use to identify
that individual for vagueness purposes, but we can safely assume that, for
the construct to make sense, it must correspond to reality. Just as someone
need not be an Olympic athlete to be physically fit, a person need not be a
Nobel laureate to possess “ordinary intelligence.” That would set the bar so
high that the extraordinary would become the ordinary. Language does not
equate the two, so neither should the law.
If that is true, actual population demographics matter. Here, then, are the
facts: According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2015 nearly ninety percent of
adults had at least a high school diploma or a Graduate Equivalency Degree
(GED).36 Roughly fifty-nine percent had completed at least some amount of
college without receiving a degree.37 Only forty-two percent, however,
received an associate’s degree, only thirty-three percent received a
bachelor’s degree, and only twelve percent received an advanced degree of
some type.38
Those facts make clear that the “person of ordinary intelligence” is not a
lawyer, a judge, or a law professor. Nor is he someone with legal, technical,
scientific, or any other type of advanced education and training in fields
such as medicine, biochemistry, geology, hydrology, and so forth. The
Census Bureau’s data makes it clear that the standard is what an average
high school graduate would know to be the law. Requiring anything more
would have the practical effect of requiring a person to obtain legal or
scientific education or advice to know what the law forbids. The common
law certainly imposed no such duty. Indeed, any such obligation would
have been entirely senseless at a time when there were few people who
could read and write, even fewer lawyers, and no law schools. That state of
gang”); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 10 (1931) (“unreasonable
waste”); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931) (“auto transportation company” as applied to
a non-common carrier); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (displaying any
“symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government”); Cline v. Frank Dairy Co., 274
U.S. 445 (1927) (“unreasonable” profits); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
(“the current rate of per diem wages in the locality”); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S.
109 (1921) (charging “excessive prices for . . . necessaries”); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (“any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling . . .
any necessaries”); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914) (“real” price or value).
36. See CAMILLE L. RYAN & KURT BAUMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM.,
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 1-2 Tbl. 1 (Mar. 2016).
37. See id.
38. See id.
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affairs, of course, is no longer true. The average person now has a high
school diploma. But no legislature has required a person to consult an
attorney or other expert to avoid becoming a criminal. On the contrary,
courts have looked askance on claims that a person should be exculpated
because he followed legal advice.39
With the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in mind, Doris would then have
drafted the code. She would have included the common law crimes,
supplemented by the blue-collar and white-collar crimes that assemblies
and courts had added over the years. Before giving her draft to the
legislatures, she would have stood back and looked at her draft code as a
whole. That is when it would have struck her.
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine teaches that each individual law must
be understandable, and it supplies the test for gauging the
comprehensibility of a particular statute. Making sure that a person of
ordinary intelligence could understand precisely what each statute outlaws,
however, solves only part of the notice problem. The penal code demands
that every person comply with every criminal statute, which means that
everyone must know what the entire code prohibits. That raises the
question whether there were too many statutes in Doris’s draft code for the
average person to understand and remember. Doris would have realized
that she had an entirely different problem, one that no legislature or court
had ever considered.
III. THE CRIMINAL LAW IS TOO VOLUMINOUS AND COMPLEX FOR A
PERSON OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE TO KNOW IT ALL
The problem was due to the enormous growth in the volume and
complexity of the penal code. Consider the federal criminal code. What
started in 1789 as a copse of roughly thirty trees had now become a jungle
more than 100 times larger. There are thousands of criminal laws, many of
them quite new, making the code one-third larger in 2004 than it had been
in 1980.40 In fact, there are now so many federal offenses that no one—
neither the U.S. Department of Justice, the American Bar Association, nor
the Congressional Research Service, each of which had actually tried to
answer that question—knew what was the correct number.41 If they could

39. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) (ruling that reliance on
the advice of counsel is not a complete defense to a crime).
40. See Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 6, at 729.
41. See id. at 726.

346

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:335

not answer that question, Doris realized, the average high school graduate
could not be expected to have the answer.
That problem is only worsened, Doris would have realized, when she
considered that agencies can promulgate regulations whose violation can be
punished as a crime.42 People of “ordinary intelligence” do not read the
Code of Federal Regulations (unless they have trouble falling asleep). Few
have probably heard of the Federal Register, let alone know where to find it.
As Justice Lewis Powell once noted, it “is totally unrealistic to assume that
more than a fraction of the persons and entities affected by a regulation . . .
would have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access to
the Federal Register.”43 People are generally aware of what the criminal law
prohibits insofar as it tracks the prevailing moral code. By the time of
adolescence, everyone knows not to murder, rape, rob, or swindle someone
else.44 (Anyone who claims that he was unaware that theft and murder are
illegal is effectively raising an insanity defense and should be treated as if he
had expressly done so.) Indeed, Anglo-American criminal law grew out of
pre-Norman customs.45 But no society, including this one, catalogues its
morals or mores in a Code of Federal Regulations, nor is there a
longstanding American tradition of referring to any such document to learn
those norms. If so, why is it reasonable to expect that people should be
required, at risk of imprisonment if they fail, to know what rules are found
in the CFR?

42. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Larkin, Public Choice, supra note
6, at 728–29.
43. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
44. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
108-09 (1993) (“Perhaps the most primitive and basic rules in the criminal justice system
were those that protected property rights . . . . The laws against theft, larceny, embezzlement,
and fraud are familiar friends. People may not know every technical detail, but they get the
general point. Probably all human communities punish theft in one way or another; it is hard
to imagine a society that does not have a concept of thievery, and some way to punish people
who help themselves to things that ‘belong’ to somebody else.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (1881) (“[T]he fact that crimes are also generally sins is one of the
practical justifications for requiring a man to know the criminal law.”); LAFAVE, supra note 3,
at 14-15; JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 427 (8th ed. 1930); Hall & Seligman, supra note 23,
at 644 (“[T]he early criminal law appears to have been well integrated with the mores of the
time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.”’); Sayre, supra note 3, at 68–69; Mark D. Yochum,
The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law Is No Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a Little
Sex), 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COM. 635, 636 (1999) (“[E]vil is fundamentally known . . . .
Ignorance that murder is a crime is no excuse for the crime of murder.”).
45. See Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, at 327-29.
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What does that tell us? The above figures, of course, do not equate with
intelligence or mental ability. Many people without formal education and
degrees are more learned and savvier than some college faculty members,
particularly with regard to understanding community norms. But those
figures give us some help in deciding how much knowledge of the criminal
law we can expect the average person to have. If you expect people to know
what high school graduates know, you should succeed with nearly ninety
percent of adults. That will not reach everyone, but ninety percent is a very
large portion of the population, and it may be the most that anyone could
expect. By contrast, if you expect the population to know what only
someone with a college or advanced degree could understand, two-thirds of
the population would fail. That is quite troublesome. No system of justice
could call itself fair if two of every three people cannot avoid running afoul
of the law. Indeed, it is possible that more than two thirds of the Roman
public knew the criminal code during the time of the Roman Emperor
Caligula even though he published the laws in a location that effectively
made them unreadable.46
We now have a very serious problem, Doris would have surmised.
On the one hand, the Due Process Clause requires the government to
inform someone in a particular case of the specific charges and penalties he
faces when he is sued for a tort or charged with a crime.47 The rationale is
that everyone has the right to defend himself against any claim or charge,
and that right is meaningless if a trial can be held in his absence. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has never required a legislature to send a
copy of every new criminal law to everyone in its jurisdiction, and for more
than 200 years none of them did. Publication of a statute in the federal or a
state penal code is the traditional means of notifying the public what is now
a crime.48 But that is more a matter of necessity than anything else.49 No one

46. See supra note 23.
47. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120–
21 (1991) (ruling that the defendant must have adequate notice of his eligibility for the death
penalty); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–20 (1950); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (“A person's right to
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a
right to his day in court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence . . . .”).
48. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 207 (1985) (“Publication of a statute's text always suffices; the
government need make no further effort to apprise the people of the content of the law.”).
49. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.) (“It may well be true that
in most cases the proposition that the words of the United States Code or the Statutes at
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believes that the average person reads the Congressional Record, the
Statutes at Large, or the Federal Register. The result is that a person can
unwittingly engage in conduct that neither he nor any reasonable person
would have known to be a crime. That is particularly true when the criminal
law proposes to outlaw conduct that previously was not an offense.50 Yes, he
will be notified when the government charges him with committing that
offense, but his trial will largely be a formality. What a person needs to
know is whether he is near the line of criminality. Proving that someone
crossed a line that no one knew existed is uncomfortably similar to proving
that he crossed a line that was drawn only after he had crossed it. Because
“compliance presupposes knowledge,”51 the public must be aware of the
metes and bounds of the criminal law; otherwise, there is a serious risk of
oppression.
How, then, can the very different notice rules mentioned above be
reconciled?52 Claiming that there is a difference between the notice required
in civil and criminal cases is unsatisfactory. Why should less notice be
sufficient when the potential penalty is far greater? Relying on history is
even less comforting. Have the federal and state governments regularly
violated the Due Process Clause in criminal cases throughout the last two
centuries plus? The implications of an affirmative answer to that question
are disturbing. Even less satisfying is resort to the maxim that “Every man is
presumed to know the law.” We indulge that fiction, at least insofar as the
code reflects the Decalogue, because, as discussed below, it makes sense to
that limited extent, but principally due to the limits of practicality. There is

Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something of a fiction . . . albeit one required in
any system of law . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459 (quoted supra note 25); Connally, 269 U.S. at 391
(“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play
and the settled rules of law . . . .”).
51. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345,
400 (1994).
52. See Jeffries, supra note 48, at 207 (“In the context of civil litigation, where notice is
taken seriously, publication is a last resort; more effective means must be employed wherever
possible. It may be objected that no more effective means is possible where the intended
recipient of the information is the entire populace or some broad segment thereof, rather
than an identifiable individual or entity. But this argument at most explains why publication
should sometimes suffice; it does not explain why no further obligation is ever considered.
Nor does it explain why publication in some official document, no matter how inaccessible,
is all that is required.”) (footnotes omitted).
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little else that we can do.53 But “necessary fiction descends to needless
farce,” to quote Justice Antonin Scalia, when that proposition is pushed too
far.54
Historically, the criminal law has built a critical safeguard to prevent the
conviction of people who are not morally blameworthy: the requirement
that the government prove that a person committed an unlawful act with a
“guilty mind” or an “evil intent.” Anglo-American common law
traditionally has required both elements for conduct to be a crime. “Actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”55—a crime consists of “a vicious will” and
“an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.”56 Unfortunately,
criminal laws today generally do not require the government to prove that
the defendant knew he committed a crime. One way to require that proof is
for the legislature to force the prosecution to prove that someone acted
“willfully”—that is, he voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal
duty.57 But that is a rarity in federal and state criminal law.
To make matters worse, in some instances legislatures have consciously
adopted strict liability statutes, laws that impose liability simply for doing
an act regardless of the actor’s state of mind.58 In other cases, legislatures,
53. See R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 309 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“It may well be true that in most cases the proposition that the words of the
United States Code or the Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something
of a fiction, . . . albeit one required in any system of law”) (citation omitted).
54. See id. (“[N]ecessary fiction descends to needless farce when the public is charged
even with knowledge of Committee Reports.”).
55. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932). In English, the
maxim means that an act does not make one guilty unless the mind is guilty.
56. See, e.g. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *21; see also, e.g., Roscoe Pound,
Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW 8–9 (1927)
(“Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious
will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong
and choosing freely to do wrong.”).
57. The Supreme Court has consistently read the term “willful” to have that meaning.
See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S.
135, 137 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); United States v.
Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973); see also
United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (adopting the same
interpretation for the export control laws).
58. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1075-76 (2014) (hereafter
Larkin, Strict Liability); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 38-39 (1997) (“[T]he more dominant and
longer-standing trend in our century has been the erosion of mens rea requirements. This
period has seen the dramatic growth of strict liability offenses (and their close cousin,
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whether due to forgetfulness, sloppiness, or otherwise, have failed to ensure
that a statute requires proof of a guilty mind as to an important element of
an offense.59 Either failing is troublesome. Numerous giants in the criminal
law—H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, Herbert Packer, and the American Law
Institute, among others—have consistently denounced strict criminal liability
on a variety of grounds.60 As Herbert Wechsler once noted, “The most that
can be said for such provisions is that where the penalty is light, where
knowledge normally obtains and where a major burden of litigation is
envisioned, there may be some practical basis for a stark limitation of the
issues.”61 In those instances, “large injustice can seldom be done.”62 Yet, as
he added, “[i]f these considerations are persuasive,” strict liability should
never be an option “where any major sanction is involved.”63 As long as the
liability for negligence) in American criminal law, and such offenses have found a particular
home in the kind of regulatory criminal statutes that have the greatest impact in corporate
settings.”).
59. See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015).
60. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); LARRY
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW 71 (2009) (“We are not morally culpable for taking risks of which we are unaware.”);
ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 178–84
(2009); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (1969) (“Strict criminal liability has never
achieved respectability in our law.”); H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal
Responsibility, in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 152 (2008) (“[S]trict liability is odious.”); PACKER, supra note 20, at 130–31; Francis
A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. L. REV.
737, 742–48 (1981); Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process
Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 25 (Gertrude
Ezorsky ed., 2015); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 422-25 (1958); Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 602-03
(1958); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 267–68 (1987); Rollin M.
Perkins, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting Trend, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1067–
70 (1983); Paul Roberts, Strict Liability and the Presumption of Innocence: An Expose of
Functionalist Assumptions, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 182, 191 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005);
Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive
Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571 (1978); Sayre, supra note 3, at 56; A.P.
Simester, Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY, supra, at 21
(Strict liability is wrong because it “leads to conviction of persons who are, morally speaking,
innocent . . . .”); Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of
Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989); see generally Larkin, Strict Liability,
supra note 58 at 1079 n.46.
61. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 1109.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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criminal law sought to imprison only those people who, as the saying goes,
took the law into their own hands, the risk of oppression could be kept to a
minimum. Today, however, that safeguard is less certain, making the notice
problem more acute.
Doris would have then turned back to the rationale why the criminal law
must be written, clear, and understandable. She would have considered the
rationale that the Supreme Court had offered why the criminal law must be
clear. The law must afford the average person fair warning of what can get
someone fined, imprisoned, or hung. Doris would have discovered that the
Court had offered a similar rationale for the canon of statutory construction
teaching that ambiguous criminal laws must be strictly construed. As Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in McBoyle v. United States,64 the
criminal law does not demand clarity on the ground that it assumes that the
average person will read a criminal statute before acting. The likelihood of
that happening is slim.65 It requires clarity so that, if someone were to do
that, he would know where to find the line between lawful and unlawful
conduct.66 For that reason, the criminal law must ensure that “a fair
warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,”
and, “[t]o make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be
clear.”67
Perhaps that rationale made sense in 1914, when the Supreme Court
adopted the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, Doris would have surmised, or
perhaps it made sense in 1931, when the Court decided McBoyle. But she
knew that it made little sense in 2018. The reason is that the issue today is
materially different from the one that the Court faced in those years. Today,
the question is not whether the average person can identify a tree as a tree
when he looks at it close up, but is whether he can know the number of
trees in the forest when he is standing in the middle of thousands of them.

64. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
65. I am reminded of an old joke told about W.C. Fields. A passerby saw him reading
the Bible one day and, because Fields was not considered a religious man, the passerby asked
him why he was reading it. “I’m looking for loopholes,” Fields replied.
66. “Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law
before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world
in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.”
McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27.
67. Id.
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IV. SOCIAL NORMS ARE INADEQUATE TO TEACH A PERSON OF ORDINARY
INTELLIGENCE THE FULL CONTENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
Maybe informal social norms could make up the difference, Doris would
have hoped. The criminal law began as a collection of local customs and
mores,68 and there continues to be a consensus about certain basic
offenses.69 Perhaps the basic precepts of contemporary social norms would
be adequate to supply an ordinary person with the knowledge that he needs
to stay on the right side of the law if he is so inclined. Aside from informally
learning the basic principles represented by the penal code, Doris would
have remembered, individuals learn a host of different community norms
that are necessary for a civil society and that, when absent, are signs of
social disorder, such as the accumulation of garbage, public drinking and
urination, panhandling, prostitution, the congregation of teenagers, graffiti,
abandoned buildings and property, and so forth.70 At least, she thought, the
issue was worth considering. To see what she could learn about the
development of social norms, Doris would have sought to learn about the
relationship between morals and the law from traditional legal sources71 and
68. See supra text accompanying note 45.
69. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 5 (1990) (“In the case of common crime, a large body of
research indicates that there is in fact a value consensus. People of all races and classes agree
we should shun theft, violence, sexual assault, and aggression against children. They give
very similar ratings to the seriousness of various kinds of offenses, and they agree to a
surprising extent on how stiff the punishments ought to be for violations of the law. The
issue of what is criminal has been settled politically in debate over the criminal code, and
within law-abiding society there is broad consensus on such matters. These middle-class
values are just about everyone’s values.”); supra note 44. In theory, recent immigrants may be
unaware of those norms, and studies apparently go both ways on the issue. See RUTH D.
PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS: NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE
RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 36 (2010). Some have argued that a defendant should escape
criminal liability if he reasonably believed that foreign law or custom justified his actions. See
Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986) (proposing a
defense based on foreign cultural acceptability). That argument, to put it kindly, is absurd.
Perhaps, the rape of women is culturally acceptable in some parts of the world, but not in
this country. Nor would warfare between Boston and Philadelphia fans be acceptable
because the Eagles beat the Patriots in the Super Bowl. Endorsing any such defense would
invite disregard of the law, discrimination, and chaos. It is for precisely those reasons that
the courts have uniformly rejected a plea for a right to jury nullification. See Paul J. Larkin,
Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcriminalization, 28 A.B.A. J. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 10, 15 (Spring 2013).
70. See SKOGAN, supra note 69, at 1-5.
71. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER,
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from scholars in the fields of cognitive, developmental, evolutionary, and
social psychology.72
According to the theory proposed by Professor Michael Tomasello,
norms arose during the two stages of human evolution and societal
development. The first stage occurred hundreds of thousands of years ago
as humans evolved from primates. Over time, proto-humans came to
realize that cooperation was a necessary strategy for survival because
multiple hunters (“We”) were more successful than one (“I”).73 The result
was an awareness of the benefits of cooperative behavior, the recognition of
a sense of group purpose, and the development of the “We” versus “They”
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment,
Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980); William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
545 (1994); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 377 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and
Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996); Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
72. See, e.g., ELLIOTT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (9th ed. 2004); GEOFFREY BRENNAN
ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS (2013); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Rev.
ed. 2006); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE WILD: HOW TO DIAGNOSE, MEASURE, AND
CHANGE SOCIAL NORMS (2017); THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS (Cristina Bicchieri et al. eds.,
1997); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF
SOCIAL NORMS (2006) (hereafter BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY); DONALD BLACK, THE
BEHAVIOR OF LAW (Special ed. 2010); HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF
REASON (2017); DARCIA NARVAEZ, NEUROBIOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN
MORALITY (2014); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (Rev. ed. 1971);
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ROBERT SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (Rev. ed. 1981);
MICHAEL TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN MORALITY (2016) (hereafter
TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS
(2015).
73. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 2-3 (“We proceed from the
assumption that human morality is a form of cooperation, specifically, the form that has
emerged as humans have adapted to new and species-unique forms of social interaction and
organization. Because Homo sapiens is an ultracooperative primate, and presumably the only
moral one, we further assume that human morality comprises the key set of species-unique
proximate mechanisms—psychological processes of cognition, social interaction, and selfregulation—that enable human individuals to survive and thrive in their especially
cooperative social arrangements.”).
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concept that is essential to group cohesion.74 Once combined, the success of
those precepts ultimately gave birth to awareness of the desirability of group
identity based on a shared morality.75 The second stage stemmed from the
need for specialization as communities grew larger. Subgroups became
responsible for different tasks for community survival. To maintain
cohesiveness, the overall community developed social norms to which each
individual and subgroup was required to adhere even when doing so ran
contrary to his or their personal interests. Community norms required
sacrificing personal gain for the betterment of all. The community punished
its members when they deviated from a norm in order to give it teeth for
the purpose of encouraging compliance and to avoid creating in compliant
members the belief that they were fools for foregoing individual
advancement for communal benefit.
Aside from serving as commitment to overall welfare, compliance with
social norms performed as an important signaling function.76 It constituted
a public declaration that a particular subgroup’s members deemed the
community’s norms legitimate, while also manifesting each individual’s
commitment to the community’s survival.77 Small bands and their members

74. That sense of “We” can survive even if the group’s members know little about each
other except for the fact that they belong to the same group, a phenomenon known as the
“minimal group effect.” SAM GLASER, SUSPECT RACE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL
PROFILING 54 (2015).
75. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“Conventional cultural practices
had role ideals that were fully ‘objective’ in the sense that everyone knew in cultural common
ground how anyone who would be one of ‘us’ had to play those roles for collective success.
They represented the right and wrong ways to do things.”).
76. Of course, not every conforming behavior signals commitment to the community’s
needs. See POSNER, supra note 72, at 25-26 (“It should be clear that there are actually two
ways in which signaling results in social norms. First, people engage in costly actions, like
gift-giving, consumption of expensive goods, and shunning of people with certain
characteristics, to signal that they value future payoffs more than bad types do. Second,
people engage even in cheap actions, like combing their hair in one way rather than another,
because their deviation from the norm will be punished by others who seek to signal their
types by taking the costly action of shunning people who act in an unusual way. What we call
a social norm, when, for example, we advise well-meaning strangers about how to behave in
our communities, is simply a description of the behavior that emerges in these signaling
equilibriums. In this model the social norm has no independent power, it is not an
exogenous force, it is not internalized; it is a term for behavioral regularities that emerge as
people interact with each other in pursuit of their everyday interests.”) (footnote omitted).
77. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“Moral norms were considered
legitimate because the individual, first, identified with the culture and so assumed a kind of
coauthorship of them and, second, felt that her equally deserving cultural counterparts
deserved her cooperation. Members of cultural groups thus felt an obligation to both follow
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displayed their allegiance to the larger community by adhering to
collectively generated objective cultural values.78 By internalizing social
norms, individuals conformed their behavior to accepted group standards
of right and wrong, which promoted “homogeneity of behavior” and
communicated a strong sense of solidarity to insiders and outsiders.79
The result was the creation of objective cultural norms that served several
different community survival goals: They provided a standard of right and
wrong conduct useful for measuring group allegiance; they created the
opportunity for compliance to signal approval of and allegiance to
communal norms; and they defined and telegraphed to neighbors a separate
community to which no one could join without agreeing to sacrifice
individual interests to the greater good.80 At bottom, social norms and the
governing institutions enforcing them provided the glue that held successful
communities together.81 In a competitive struggle for resources,
communities that were able to foster cooperation among their constituents
were able to outcompete rival groups that were unable to generate
comparable group commitment.82 Compliance with norms enabled each
community to undertake survival functions efficiently while also presenting
itself as a formidable adversary to neighboring bands that might potentially
compete for resources.
and enforce social norms as part of their moral identity: to remain one who one was in the
eye of the moral community, and so in one’s own eyes as well, one who was obliged to
identify the right and wrong way of doing things[.] . . . One could deviate from these norms
and still maintain one’s moral identify only by justifying the deviation to others, and so to
oneself, in terms of the shared values of the moral community[.]”); see also POSNER, supra
note 72, at 21 (“[S]ignaling is an important way not only of entering relationships, but also of
maintaining them. . . . A large amount of social, family, political, and business behavior can
be understood in terms of signals.”).
78. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“And so was born a normatively
constituted social order in which cooperatively rational agents focused not just on how
individuals do act, or on how I want them to act, but, rather, on how they ought to act if they
are to be one of ‘us.’”) (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 12; see also POSNER, supra note 71, at 24 (“[S]ocial norms are always about
observed behavior . . . .”).
80. TOMASELLO, HUMAN MORALITY, supra note 72, at 5 (“[In Stage Two], the normative
standards were fully ‘objective,’ the collective commitments were by and for all in the group,
and the sense of obligation was group-mindedly rational in that it flowed from one’s moral
identify and the felt need to justify one’s moral decisions to the moral community including
oneself. In the end, the result of all these new ways of relating to one another in collectively
structured cultural contexts added up for modern humans to be a kind of cultural and group
minded ‘objective’ morality.”).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 12.
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Ancient social norms critical to community survival have endured to the
present.83 Norms have become the “grammar,” 84 the “cement,”85 or the
“traffic rules”86 of society. Even today a norm is “a prescription about how
to behave in a specific situation.”87 Norms refer to “behavior, to actions over
which people have control, and are supported by shared expectations about
what should/should not be done in different types of social situations.”88 A
norm can be “formal or informal, personal or collective, descriptive of what
most people do, or prescriptive of behavior.”89 Norms provide “scripts” for
us to follow in making unconscious, automatic choices.90 Because social
norms define collective obligations, they can require us to act contrary to

83. Id. at 6-7 (“One outcome of this two-step evolutionary process beyond great apes—
first to collaboration and then to culture—is that contemporary human beings are under the
sway of at least three distinct moralities. The first is simply the cooperative proclivities of
great apes in general, organized around a special sympathy for kin and friends: the first
person I save from a burning shelter is my child or spouse, no deliberation needed. The
second is a joint morality of collaboration in which I have specific responsibilities to specific
individuals in the specific circumstances: the next person I save is the firefighting partner
with whom I am currently collaborating (and with whom I have a joint commitment) to
extinguish the fire. The third is a more impersonal collective morality of cultural norms and
institutions in which all members of the cultural group are equally valuable: I save from the
calamity all other groupmates equally and impartially (or perhaps all other persons, if my
moral community is humanity in general), with perhaps special attention to the most
vulnerable among us (e.g., children).”).
84. “Norms are the language a society speaks, the embodiment of its values and
collective desires, the secure guide in the uncertain lands we all traverse, the common
practices that hold human groups together.” BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra
note 72, at ix.
85. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989).
86. Id. at 101.
87. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 94.
88. Id. at 10.
89. Id. at 1.
90. A “script” is a “stylized, stereotypical sequence of actions that are appropriate in [a
particular] context” and “‘defin[e] actors and roles.’” Id. at 94. “Social norms are embedded
into scripts.” Id. (emphasis omitted). “[W]e reason in modular ways: Most reasoning does
not involve the application of general-purpose reasoning skills. Rather, our reasoning is tied
to specific schemata or scripts related to particular bodies of knowledge . . . . Once a problem
is understood in terms of a familiar schema, reasoning is correctly applied. Logicians and
moral philosophers handle abstract concepts professionally, but the vast majority of people
need the familiarity of well-known schemata to seamlessly perform logical operations and
successfully employ moral reasoning.” Id. at 95. That is, a norm calls for Response X in
Situation Y. A script explains how Response X plays out. Id. at 96.
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our self-interest.91 They are not “written and codified; you cannot find them
in books or be explicitly told about them at the outset of your immersion in
a foreign culture.”92 Sometimes, we learn when others teach us; occasionally,
observation alone is sufficient; in some cases, we learn through trial and
error.93 We comply with “social norms,” the rules of the road for
cooperative social behavior, for several reasons,94 such as the desire to avoid
suffering an externally imposed sanction for noncompliance or in reliance
on a decision-making heuristic operating consciously (or unconsciously)
whenever we face a normative choice.95 Communal norms even influence

91. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 34, 38, 42 (“Social
norms prescribe or proscribe behavior; they entail obligations and are supported by
normative expectations. Not only do we expect others to conform to a social norm; we are
also aware that we are expected to conform, and both these expectations are necessary
reasons to comply with the norm.”).
92. Id. at ix (emphasis omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 176-77 (“[N]orm formation is a step-by-step process. In a newly formed
group, all members will anchor the current situation to what they perceive are previously
experienced situations. Each group member will have a sense of what behavioral scripts are
appropriate to the new situation because they resemble behaviors adopted in similar social
contexts. As they interact, group members trade scripts, and, through discussion, they come
to form a shared perspective what the ‘appropriate behavior’ is. Once a new, local script has
been adopted people will interact according to the script and will even tend to apply the
same script to new situations in which they are matched with different group members.
When a script is agreed upon, a local norm is formed, and usually attempts to alter the
behavior it controls will be met by sanctions . . . . [S]ince we are not a tabula rasa, every new
group norm will be the result of a process of importing and reshaping old scripts to new
situations. We look for analogies with past experiences to guide us, and the final outcome of
this collective search will be something new that we can still recognize as familiar.”).
95. Id. at 3-4. Heuristic decision-making involves the automatic recall of the same or
similar situations and an analysis of the plusses and minuses of following alternative paths,
all of which is done in milliseconds. Norms provide a default or starting point for that
analysis. Heuristic decision-making differs from the classic Chicago School cost-benefit
analysis, which is done consciously. Id. at 4-6, 68-69 (“[T]he deliberational route to behavior
is hardly the most common modus operandi, and social norms are habitually followed in an
automatic way. We leave a tip in a foreign country although we know that service is
included, trust strangers, exact revenge, donate to charities, reprimand transgressors even
when we are not directly harmed, and show favoritism toward groups to which we belong
without much thought to the reasons for, or the consequences of, what we are doing. More
often than not, we behave in the ‘right’ way in that we follow the rules of our group,
subculture or society. In so doing we coordinate with others, fulfill their normative
expectations, and collectively behave in ways that validate our material expectations.”); Cass
R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 522 (2007) (“[P]eople have rapid, immediate reactions to persons,
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how we perceive the reality that gives rise to such choices, because people
are far more willing to accept facts that support their social
predispositions.96
The evolutionary development of social norms serves a didactic function,
Doris would have thought, because social norms are the background against
which the law is imposed.97 Anglo-American criminal law originated out of
the customs of pre-Norman England.98 “Early English ‘law’ reflected the
Anglo-Saxon-Jute-Dane customs of the local community and was
rudimentary at best, both ‘rough and crude.’”99 The first “laws” were not
even “laws” as we know them today. They consisted of either the local
customs, “the folk-right,” of each separate English community, or decrees,
known as “dooms,” which were essentially a tariff of payments due to the
victim or his kin to forestall violent retaliation for injuries such as murder,
mayhem, or cattle theft.100 Everyone knew the conduct forbidden by local
norms. William I left those customs in place after becoming king. To
centralize his control over England’s diverse local communities, he
established a system of justice. The crown’s judges initiated the process of
“riding circuit” to adjudicate disputes across the kingdom. To develop rules
of decision, royal magistrates developed “the common law”—viz., the
“customary practice,” the “common conviction of the community,” or the

activities, and processes, and the immediate reaction operates as a mental shortcut for a
more deliberative or analytic assessment of the underlying issues.”).
96. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 151 (2006) (“[C]ultural commitments operate as a kind of heuristic in
the rational processing of information on public policy matters. Again, citizens aren't in a
position to figure out through personal investigation whether the death penalty deters, gun
control undermines public safety, commerce threatens the environment, et cetera. They have
to take the word of those whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims, and
what sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible. The people they trust, naturally, are
the ones who share their values—and who as a result of this same dynamic and others are
predisposed to a particular view. As a result, even citizens who earnestly consider empirical
policy issues in an open-minded and wholly instrumental way will align themselves into
warring cultural factions.”).
97. See POSNER, supra note 71, at 4.
98. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 1-3, 8-9 (4th ed.
2007); CHRISTOPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY III 45 (1961); FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1-4 (2008); FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6, 19, 193-99
(1915); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 148-53 (1904); see
generally Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, at 327-31.
99. Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28, at 327.
100. Id. at 327, 329.
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“general custom of England.”101 The common law carried forward the
offenses likely to disturb ‘the king’s peace’” and added to that list conduct
that the church deemed immoral.102 Over time, scholars such as Ranulf de
Glanville, Henry de Bracton, Thomas de Littleton, Edward Coke, and
William Blackstone compiled the common law into treatises, and
parliament took over the business of defining crimes.103
The result was that the English criminal law came to consist of
dangerous, injurious, or appropriative conduct, as well as immoral
behavior, crimes against man and God. The early common law, therefore,
aligned perfectly with the need to keep the king’s peace and to abide by
God’s rules.104 Anyone who knew the Decalogue would have been familiar
with English criminal law. The colonists brought that law with them to
America.105 Even today the average person acquires a basic understanding
of the law by learning the mores and customs—the norms—of the
community from family, friends, teachers, clergy, and respected elders.
But there is a limit to a person’s ability to acquire the necessary legal
knowledge by observing and incorporating norms and social customs into
their knowledge base. Scholars in anthropological, behavioral, and cognitive
psychology have explained that people acquire knowledge of customs
through interaction in various social settings as they observe the behavior of
others, experiment with their own responses, and receive feedback whether
their actions conform to accepted social norms.106 Norms of course differ
from legal rules. The former are informal; not always enforced; and, when
they are enforced, the state plays no role. The latter are formal, are regularly
enforced (within resource constraints), and are always enforced only by the
state. Knowledge of customs therefore does not always translate into an
101. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *67; Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines, supra note 28,
at 330-31.
102. See Sayre, supra note 3, at 68-69 (“The original objective of the criminal law was to
keep the peace; and under the strong church influence of the Middle Ages its function was
extended to curb moral delinquencies of one kind or another.”).
103. MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 98, at 2; Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines,
supra note 28, at 332.
104. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (1881) (“[T]he fact that
crimes are also generally sins is one of the practical justifications for requiring a man to
know the criminal law.”); Sayre, supra note 3, at 68-69; supra note 44.
105. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (noting that the Colonists
“inherited the traditions of the English law and history”); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30-31 (1990); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 299-300 (1998); Larkin, Lost Due Process Doctrines,
supra note 28, at 339-40.
106. See supra note 74.
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understanding of the law, especially when the latter is divorced from moral
considerations. A second difficulty is that the criminal law defines
prohibited conduct, which, by definition, are those actions that others
should not commit, making it more difficult to learn forbidden conduct
through observation.107 “As anyone who has lived in a foreign country
knows, learning proscriptive norms can be difficult and the learning process
slow and fraught with misunderstandings and false steps.”108 The third
difficulty deals with the different size of the relevant reference group. As the
size of that group increases so too does the difficulty of accurately divining a
group norm.109 A fourth problem is that, as the difficulty increases of
knowing the existence of a specific criminal law or how it applies in a
particular setting, fewer and fewer members of the same cohort will be
aware of what should be done to avoid it. The upshot is that there is no
guarantee that individuals can learn the criminal law from observing
behavior on a type of “on-the-job” training basis.
Communities enforce social norms through informal methods such as
criticism, ostracism, shunning, or expulsion. The criminal law takes those
sanctions as givens and adds formal, government-imposed penalties that
take the form of fines, incarceration, post-release work disabilities, and, in
extreme cases, capital punishment. Yet, the criminal law recognizes that
there are limits on the ability of public obloquy and exogenous punishment
to force compliance with social norms and legal rules. Jean Valjean was not
the first person to steal food rather than starve, and he surely will not be the
last. The defenses of necessity and duress exist because there are
circumstances in which no one can reasonably be expected to avoid
committing a crime.110 Each one recognizes that there can be force of
107. See, e.g., BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 8 (“A norm cannot
be simply identified with a recurrent, collective, behavioral pattern. For one, norms can be
either prescriptive or proscriptive. In the latter case, we usually do not observe the proscribed
behavior . . . . In most cases in which a proscriptive norm is in place, we do not observe the
behavior proscribed by the norm, and it is impossible to determine whether the absence of
certain behaviors is due to a proscription or to something else, unless we access people’s
beliefs and expectations.”).
108. Id. at 1, 8 (“Often the legal system helps, in that many proscriptive norms are made
explicit and supported by laws, but a host of socially relevant proscriptions such as ‘do not
stare at someone you pass by’ or ‘do not touch people you are not intimate with when you
talk to them’ are not codified and can only be learned by trial and error.”).
109. See Cristina Bicchieri, Learning to Cooperate, in BICCHIERI, THE DYNAMICS OF
NORMS, supra note 72, at 18.
110. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980) (“Common law historically
distinguished between the defenses of duress and necessity. Duress was said to excuse
criminal conduct where the actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious
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natural (necessity) or human (duress) compulsion that no reasonable
person can resist. They are “a tacit admission of man’s impotence against
some of the greatest evils that assail him, as well as a measure of his moral
obligation even in extremis.”111 A person cannot murder someone else to
avoid his own death,112 yet the same person can leave a burning jail without
committing the crime of escape.113 The existence of those defenses is a
candid admission that neither informal social norms nor formal legal rules,
nor the punishments that the community and government can impose for
their violation, can always guarantee cooperation, compliance, and selfsacrifice in the face of an immediate, unavoidable severe harm.
That concession to human reality is instructive in this context. It would
seem to follow that, if the law acknowledges limits to human willpower, the
law should also be willing to recognize limits to human candlepower. After
all, the latter is as much a feature of the make-up of people as the former.
Moreover, the criminal law primarily serves to affect the behavior of actual

bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms
of the criminal law. While the defense of duress covered the situation where the coercion had
its source in the actions of other human beings, the defense of necessity, or choice of evils,
traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered
illegal conduct the lesser of two evils. Thus, where A destroyed a dike because B threatened
to kill him if he did not, A would argue that he acted under duress, whereas if A destroyed
the dike in order to protect more valuable property from flooding, A could claim a defense of
necessity . . . . Modern cases have tended to blur the distinction between duress and
necessity. In the court below, the majority discarded the labels ‘duress’ and ‘necessity,’
choosing instead to examine the policies underlying the traditional defenses. . . . In
particular, the majority felt that the defenses were designed to spare a person from
punishment if he acted ‘under threats or conditions that a person of ordinary firmness would
have been unable to resist,’ or if he reasonably believed that criminal action ‘was necessary to
avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be prevented by the statute defining the
offense . . . . The Model Penal Code redefines the defenses along similar lines.”) (citations
omitted); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (A.O.D. 1962) (definition of duress), § 3.02 (same,
“Choice of Evils”); LAFAVE, supra note 44, at 552-64 (definition of necessity).
111. HALL, supra note 3, at 416.
112. See Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
113. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868) (“[C]ommon sense accepts the
ruling . . . that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison
shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on
fire—‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’”); see also Tomoya
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952) (“An American with a dual nationality
who is charged with playing the role of the traitor may defend by showing that force or
coercion compelled such conduct.”).
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or potential lawbreakers and the attitude toward lawbreaking.114 It is not
primarily a means of educating the public about a particular subject matter,
particularly one that is scientific or technical.
Start with a simple but undeniably true proposition: no one does or
could know everything. Science offers a paradigmatic example. As Yale Law
School Professor Dan Kahan has noted, “The public is only modestly
science literate.”115 “Figuring out the empirical consequences of criminal,
environmental, and other regulatory laws is extremely complicated.
Scientists often disagree about such matters.”116 Even a scientific consensus
“is based on highly technical forms of proof that most members of the
public can't realistically be expected to understand, much less verify for
themselves.”117 The difficulty is enhanced when you remember that experts
can, and often do, disagree and that the average person resolves such
disagreements by falling back on what he is culturally conditioned to accept
as true.118
Consider the example that Professor Kahan uses to illustrate his point:
medicine.119 Suppose A, a construction worker, is suffering from weakness,
shortness of breath, and widespread bruising, and is in such distress that he
visits his physician. The physician, suspecting that A may be suffering from
cancer, refers A to an oncologist at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, who
diagnoses A as suffering from leukemia and recommends that A undergo
radiation, chemotherapy, and a bone marrow transplant to reduce and
hopefully eliminate A’s cancer. A seeks a second opinion from the Mayo
Clinic, and the oncologist there fully agrees with the one at Johns Hopkins.
What is A now likely to do? A could read whatever he can find on the
Internet to learn about his disease and the recommended treatments, but
that does not guarantee that he will learn what he needs to know. A could
then decide to apply to medical school, wait a year to learn if he has been
accepted, spend four years in school, four more years in a residency
program for internists, and then two additional years in an oncology
fellowship in order to know as much as his oncologists already know. A is
unlikely to choose that course because he would likely be dead before he
114. See POSNER, supra note 71, at 33 (“When a law changes an equilibrium, it has two
separate effects. The first effect is behavioral: the law affects the actions people take . . . . The
second effect is hermeneutic: The law changes beliefs that people have.”).
115. DAN M. KAHAN, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE
COMMUNICATION 38 (2017).
116. Kahan & Braman, supra note 96, at 149.
117. Id. at 149.
118. Id. at 167.
119. KAHAN, supra note 115, at 7.
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completed that 11-year period. Knowing that, A is likely to trust the
oncologists’ recommendations. As one scholar has noted, relying on the
expertise of others is a “division of cognitive labour that is intrinsic to all
cultures.”120
Ironically, that division of labor makes it extraordinarily difficult for the
ordinary person to acquire the criminal law knowledge that today’s codes
assume he has. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century,
industrialization and urbanization lead assemblies to draft the criminal
code into service as a means of governing a new society. Gone was the
agriculturally based economy known to the Framers. In its place was the
industrial economy of railroads, steamships, and the telegraph. The
dominant philosophy was Progressivism, which endorsed two fundamental
tenets: First, properly educated, trained, and experienced specialists can find
the necessary scientific or technical solutions for each of society’s problems.
Second, for those experts to do their job, the law should leave them free
from governance by politics, which means from control by the public and
their elected officials. The result was the creation of the Administrative State
and governance by technocrats.121
Yet, there is a necessary consequence of a commitment to the necessity of
governance by experts that the criminal law has yet to acknowledge, let
alone accept, in full. If we leave regulation to specialists because only they
can satisfactorily understand how to deal with difficult problems, then it
follows that we cannot expect ordinary people to understand the complex
solutions that experts devise. Social norms can teach us the basic principles
required to generate the trust necessary for coordinated behavior to
originate and endure. People learn and understand the simple norms that
decry murdering, raping, robbing, or swindling our neighbors. But it does
not follow that ordinary people are also capable of comprehending a highly
technical subject matter. People can be expected to recognize that dumping
a well-known poison such as arsenic into a municipal water supply is no
less an assault than hitting someone with a two-by-four. The ordinary
person, however, will not be able to extrapolate from elementary social gobys what the answer is to a highly complicated subject matter. The
difference between “recycled material” and “waste” is one such problem
that is far too difficult for “a person of ordinary intelligence” to be able to
negotiate. The average person lacks the education necessary to understand

120. Frank C. Keil, Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality, 7 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE SCIENCES 8, 368, 372 (2003).
121. See, e.g., ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM (1983).
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that difference.122 Law school graduates—people in that twelve percent of
the population with advanced degrees of some kind—would have difficulty
drawing that distinction. In fact, few lawyers would be able to define it
because the distinction is not a feature of the law of contracts, torts, civil
procedure, or any other subject that is a required course in every law school.
The distinction is drawn by regulations that only attorneys practicing
environmental law have occasion to use. Even then perhaps only lawyers
working in the subspecialty dealing with the proper storage and disposal of
hazardous waste truly know what those concepts mean.
The problem is not with the delegation of regulatory authority to
unelected administrative officials as a means of governing the industrial
process. Legislatures need to rely on the expertise of nonpolitical experts in
the executive branch for the technical know-how that governance demands.
Congress may know that a problem exists (for example, the disposal of
hazardous waste near a water supply) but recognize that it can only draft a
broadly defined term (for example, “solid waste”) in a statute (for example,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) because it lacks the scientific
knowledge to completely define that term. The sensible option would be to
authorize an expert agency (for example, the EPA) to promulgate rules
specifying the meaning of a term (for example, “hazardous waste”) by
identifying specific examples of a term’s meaning (for example, “listed
hazardous wastes”) or particular exemptions from its reach (for example,
“recyclable materials”).123 The most sensible regulatory approach to protect
public health dictates that Congress grant agencies both the authority to list
specific hazards and the flexibility to revise that list over time as science
identifies new dangers.
The problem is also not with society’s decision to use law to provide a
remedy for violations of governing statutes and rules. The law is a critical
tool for governance of an industrial society and for remedying the harms
that occur when a private or public train runs off the tracks. Tort law serves
as a mechanism for allocating responsibility for industrial injuries. The law
of equity defines the circumstances in which the government or an injured
private party can enjoin future violations of statutes and rules. Both options
are sensible ones for any society that wishes to force wrongdoers to
internalize their costs, in the words of an economist, or to provide justice to
parties injured by an errant train.
122. For a discussion of the difficulty that inquiry poses, see Vidrine v. United States, 846
F. Supp. 2d 550, 561-69 (W.D. La. 2011).
123. See Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 58, at 1088-89 (citing the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2012)), and 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 to 261.31 (2016)).

2018]

THE FOLLY OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

365

The problem is that it may be infeasible to use the criminal law as the
enforcement mechanism. The reason is that the esoteric nature of the
subject matter is beyond the ken of the ordinary person. We do not, and
could not, demand that the average person know—that is, acquire and
remember the scientific knowledge necessary to make the relevant
decisions—the research-based science underlying the judgments critical to
determine whether a particular substance is a hazardous waste. Only people
with advanced education possess the know-how critical to making those
decisions, education that, as explained above, the average person does not
possess.124 If we create administrative agencies and staff them with subject
matter experts—physicians, biochemists, geologists, hydrologists, and so
forth—because they are the only people knowledgeable enough to
understand and solve a scientific problem, we must accept that a
consequence of our decision is the recognition that ordinary individuals will
not know what specialists know. That recognition should have a powerful
effect on our willingness to use the criminal law to enforce what only a
small percentage of the public can know. We do not convict and punish
people for not understanding organic chemistry, at least not if we want
ninety-nine percent of the population to remain outside prison.
Congress acts properly by enlisting help from experts staffing
administrative agencies. It can best do its job of governing the nation by
acting at a macro level—that is, by creating specialized agencies and
empowering their experts to regulate at a micro level. By legislating in that
fashion, Congress can also grant the executive branch considerable
regulatory flexibility. An agency can revise existing rules or promulgate new
ones whenever necessary to address worsening or newly emerging hazards
without having to return to Congress for supplemental regulatory
authorization. That practice also enables the agency to invoke its superior
technical and scientific expertise regarding a particular substance,
production process, or medical condition whenever a new problem arises or
an old one becomes aggravated. Broadly written regulatory statutes granting
administrative agencies room to act and react are valuable because they
enable agencies to respond quickly by revising their rules and policies more
quickly than Congress can (ordinarily) legislate. To be sure, some members
of Congress are experts in a particular field; more than a dozen are
physicians.125 But, for the most part, they are generalists and lack the
124. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
125. Laura Dyrda, Meet the 15 Physician Members of the 115th US Congress, BECKER’S
HOSPITAL REVIEW (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospitalmanagement-administration/meet-the-15-physician-members-of-the-115th-uscongress.html.
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knowledge necessary, for example, to decide what substances are hazardous.
Scientists are better qualified for that task. If that is true, if members of
Congress cannot make expert-level decisions, why should we expect that
ordinary people can make them?
The specialization and division of labor that was a consequence of the
law’s response to industrialization and urbanization has not disappeared
over time. On the contrary, it is more prevalent today than in earlier times.
Consider, again, medicine. The European Union recognizes more than fifty
specialties;126 the United States has more than twice that number.127 In fact,
experts create subspecialties within their profession as they enhance their
knowledge of a particular discipline and, as the joke goes, learn more and
more about less and less. That development increases the likelihood for a
successful resolution of a problem, but also makes it even less likely that an
ordinary person will be able to know and understand what to do and what
decisions to make. The average person knows that he lacks not only the
generalized scientific knowledge necessary to answer a question, but also
the know-how that experts acquire in their far more discrete subspecialties.
Ordinary people recognize the value of that specialization. They see a
cardiologist if their problem is heart disease, not cancer; a pulmonologist
for breathing difficulties, not a psychiatrist: and an orthopedic surgeon for a
torn ACL, not an obstetrician. In each case, an ordinary person realizes that
he lacks the knowledge that a general practitioner possesses, let alone what a
board-certified specialist knows.
Change the scenario, have the government charge A with a felony, and
you are likely to see a parallel process: A is likely to seek advice from a
criminal defense attorney, not a lawyer who drafts wills, gives tax advice, or
handles mergers and acquisitions. A is also likely to rely on his attorney’s
recommendations regarding how to plead and what to do to defend himself
against the charge. Part of the reason is that the ordinary person is not
familiar with the options available to him. Recognition that a layman is not
qualified to defend himself against a professional prosecutor was the
principal reason why the Supreme Court of the United States concluded
that the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause grants an indigent defendant the

126. See Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Recognition of Professional Qualifications, Official Journal of the European Union, 30.9.2005,
Annex V (V.1. Doctor of Medicine) 58-90, (Sept. 7, 2005), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005L0036&rid=1.
127. See
Ass’n
of
Am.
Med.
Coll.
(2017),
https://www.aamc.org/cim/specialty/exploreoptions/list/.
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right to be represented by a lawyer at trial.128 There should be no doubt that
the average layman does not know the law to the extent that an attorney
does.
Society certainly does not expect that the ordinary person can acquire the
legal knowledge necessary to practice law simply by being observant or
researching the Internet. To practice law, one must pass the state bar
examination, and to sit for the exam, one must graduate from an accredited
law school or complete a multi-year apprenticeship in states that still allow
someone to “read the law.” Like every other type of professional school, law
schools do not assume that you know the subject matter before arriving;
they teach every student what every lawyer needs to know. Criminal law is a
basic course, often taken during the first year. A law student learns the basic
principles of the criminal law, and later relearns them when studying for the
bar exam. Attorneys who practice in that field—prosecutors, public
defenders, and private criminal defense attorneys—learn far more about the
criminal law in their jurisdiction through working with clients, opponents,
judges, and the various personnel employed by the criminal justice system
(such as police officers, federal agents, probation and parole officers, and so
forth) than they learned in class in law school.
The growth in the number and size of today’s criminal codes, as well as
in the complexity of some offenses, makes relevant the issue whether
complete knowledge of the criminal law is humanly possible. For a “person
of ordinary intelligence,” the answer is, “No.” Professor Glenn Harlan
Reynolds make that point quite well: “[A]ny reasonable observer would
have to conclude that actual knowledge of all applicable criminal laws and
regulations is impossible, especially when those regulations frequently
depart from any intuitive sense of what ‘ought’ to be legal or illegal.”129 It is
128. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)) (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”).
129. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a
Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 107–08 (2013); see also William J. Stuntz, SelfDefeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2000) (“Ordinary people do not have the time
or training to learn the contents of criminal codes.”).
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doubtful that the law can place that burden on the average person. In fact,
the task involved in acquiring that knowledge on a continuing basis would
tax the capabilities of the average lawyer, law professor, or judge. As
criminal law scholar Bill Stuntz once confessed, “even criminal law
professors rarely know much about what conduct is and isn’t criminal in
their jurisdictions.”130
Of course, legislators do not always (rarely?) pass new criminal laws after
serious reflection and debate over the need for a new rule and the wisdom
of enlisting the criminal justice system as the mechanism for enforcing it.
Elected officials generally respond to the demands of interested parties.
Those parties want the society to formally declare that the subject of interest
to them—for example, the environment—is also entitled to the protection
of the criminal law—for example, the protection afforded to bodily
integrity. Politicians, therefore, trade laws for votes. The former receive
support at the polls; the latter, status. Now, they can claim, there is no
difference between the importance of copyright theft and automobile theft.
Both are investigated and prosecuted by the state, and both can land
someone in jail for crossing the line. Forgotten or ignored in that process is
any consideration of the average person’s ability to find that line when
confronting what to do with, say, a barrel of oil that might or might not be
able to be reused or with rags that might or might not contain a sufficient
quantity of that oil to create a problem if they wind up in the wrong
location131—to say nothing of whether lobsters have to be packed in plastic
or cardboard boxes when caught.132 The criminal law should not demand
the impossible in pursuit of some “other-worldly idealism.”133
When challenged, legislators will say that prosecutors will exercise good
judgment in selecting cases to prosecute. That is not a comforting
proposition. Aside from the fact that our legal system places its trust in the
law, not in people,134 and aside from the fact that any other system would be
“irrational” and “immoral”,135 there is the problem that experience proves
that prosecutors, like other government officials, at times will be far from

130. Stuntz, supra note 129, at 1871.
131. See Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 58, at 1088-89.
132. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 17, at 777-80.
133. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d ed. 1947).
134. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (noting that ours is a
“government of laws, and not of men”).
135. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., supra note 60, at 424.
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the “angels” who would not be in need of legal restraint.136 As long as we use
the Vietnam-era “body count” method of measuring law enforcement
success,137 we will see abuses of the charging power.138 Prosecutors will find
some cases too tempting to pass up because they look like a few hours of
plea bargaining and a “cheap stat.”139
V. THE ROAD FORWARD
Where does that leave us? If we require that criminal laws already be on
the books, if we require that those laws be accessible, if we require that they
also be understandable by the average person—if we do all that, it makes
little sense to find someone guilty if no reasonable person would have
known where the line separating illegal from legal conduct lies. As Stanford
Professor Herb Packer explained long ago:
If the function of the vagueness doctrine is, as is so often said in
the cases, to give the defendant fair warning that his conduct is
criminal, then one is led to suppose that some constitutional
importance attaches to giving people such warning or at least
making such warning available to them. If a man does an act
under circumstances that make the act criminal, but he is
136. See William R. Casto, If Men Were Angels, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 666
(2012).
137. See Gene Healy, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Bush-Ashcroft Plan to “Help”
Localities Fight Gun Crime, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST
EVERYTHING 105-06 (Gene Healy ed., 2004) (“Federal prosecutors already operate under an
incentive structure that forces them to focus on the statistical ‘bottom line.’ Statistics on
arrests and convictions are the Justice Department’s bread and butter. They are submitted to
the department’s outside auditors, are instrumental in assessing the ‘performance’ of the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, and are the focus of the department’s annual report. As George
Washington University Law School Professor Jonathan Turley puts it, ‘In some ways, the
Justice Department continues to operate under the body count approach in Vietnam . . . .
They feel a need to produce a body count to Congress to justify past appropriations and
secure future increases.’”).
138. See Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE
NAME OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW” 43 (Timothy Lynch ed. 2009); Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 6, at 774-77.
139. It is difficult otherwise to explain the Justice Department’s decision to charge the
defendants in Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (charging a woman who placed a
caustic agent on the doorknob of a neighbor having an affair with her husband with a
violation of the federal criminal laws implementing the Chemical Weapons Treaty), and in
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (charging a fishing captain who threw
undersized fish overboard with violating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the ground that the fish
were a type of “tangible object” normally used to store financial information).
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unaware of those circumstances, surely he has not had fair
warning that his conduct is criminal. If “fair warning” is a
constitutional requisite in terms of the language of a criminal
statute, why is it not also a constitutional requisite so far as the
defendant's state of mind with respect to his activities is
concerned? Or, even more to the point, if he is unaware that his
conduct is labeled as criminal by a statute, is he not in much the
same position as one who is convicted under a statute which is
too vague to give “fair warning”? In both cases, the defendant is
by hypothesis unblameworthy in that he has acted without
advertence or negligent inadvertence to the possibility that his
conduct might be criminal. If warning to the prospective
defendant is really the thrust of the vagueness doctrine, then it
seems inescapable that disturbing questions are raised, not only
about so-called strict liability offenses in the criminal law, but
about the whole range of criminal liabilities that are upheld
despite the defendant's plea of ignorance of the law.140
No legal system worthy of being labeled as just can ignore the plight of
parties who cross a line that neither they nor any reasonable person could
have known. We must address that problem. Precisely how to do so is
beyond the scope of this Article, but there are at least three available
options. We can require the government to prove that every defendant
knew that he broke the law,141 we can allow someone who unwittingly

140. Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 123–24
(footnotes omitted). Packer does not stand alone in that regard:
An early objection to ignorantia legis was that it embodied the same unfairness
as ex post facto laws, at least when applied to ignorance of “positive regulations,
not taught by nature.” An author surveying American customs and institutions
and comparing them with their European counterparts wrote in 1792:
“Where a man is ignorant of [a positive regulation], he is in the same
situation as if the law did not exist. To read it to him from the tribunal, where
he stands arraigned for the breach of it, is to him precisely the same thing as it
would be to originate it at the time by the same tribunal for the express purpose
of his condemnation.”
Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 671,
687 (1976) (quoting JOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES
OF EUROPE (1792), reprinted in 3 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 504, 511 (1968)) (footnotes
omitted).
141. See supra note 57.
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crossed the line to raise a mistake-of-law defense,142 or we can endorse
something else nearly as effective.143 Whatever choice we make, we need to
make one. If we believe that our criminal justice system should never
convict, let alone imprison, someone who was blameless because the law
was unknowable, we must make the criminal law understandable. Until
then, we must leave alone people who would mistakenly cross what can be
an invisible line.
Doris, then, would have realized that she had one more question to
consider. Does a mistake-of-law defense ask too much of the courts? How
can a court know or learn what knowledge the average person possesses
about the law? The defense requires a court to know the answers to
inquiries such as the following: Does an average person know whether
heroin trafficking is illegal (yes); whether selling software, electronic
listening devices, explosives, night-vision goggles, and the like to foreign
nations—whether Russia, China, or England—requires an export license
(probably); and whether printing for your brother an article about him
from a website requiring a paid subscription is illegal (who knows). If
judges cannot answer those questions in a reasonable, objective manner,
perhaps the appropriate course is to skip the issue altogether and decline to
recognize a mistake-of-law defense.
Doris would have concluded, however, that there was no need to
surrender to the fear that the courts cannot manage that inquiry. There are
other issues comparable in their nature to what a court must decide in
connection with a mistake-of-law defense. The most obvious one is the
inquiry required by negligence law as to whether a person’s conduct is
reasonable. Courts have undertaken that inquiry for more than a century
even though it requires them to make a judgment as to what a cost-benefit
analysis would require and what the law makes relevant.144 Moreover, there
are occasions when a person must know what a statute, ordinance, or rule

142. That is the approach I have previously suggested. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking
Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 71 (2013); Larkin, Public Choice, supra note 6, at 77781; Meese & Larkin, supra note 17.
143. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Mistakes and Justice—Using the Pardon Power to Remedy a
Mistake of Law, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651 (2017) (arguing that the president should use
his pardon power to exonerate someone who would have been acquitted if a mistake-of-law
defense had been available).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned
Hand, J.); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Henry T.
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915); cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2000) (discussing the relationship between state tort law and Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation).
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demands him to do or refrain from doing in order to act in a reasonable
manner.145 Similarly, judges must decide what society considers reasonable
when deciding many Fourth Amendment issues.146 The Amendment
protects against unjustified government intrusions into a “reasonable,”
“justifiable,” or “legitimate expectation of privacy.”147 Part of the inquiry
necessary to define that concept is to ask whether society is prepared to
accept as reasonable an individual’s own subjective expectation of
privacy.148 Both elements must be present; the Fourth Amendment does not
protect an individual’s objectively unreasonable expectation of privacy.149
There also are other instances in which a court must decide a legal issue
under a “reasonableness” standard.150 That type of inquiry, Doris would
have realized, is commonplace.
145. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 220 (W. Page Keeton gen’l ed.,
5th ed. 1984) (“The standard of conduct required of a reasonable person may be prescribed
by legislative enactment. When a statute provides that under certain circumstances
particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard for all
members of the community, from which it is negligent to deviate. The same may be true of
municipal ordinances and regulations of administrative bodies. The fact that such legislation
is usually penal in character, and carries with it a criminal penalty, will not prevent its use in
imposing civil liability, and may even be a prerequisite thereto.”) (footnotes omitted).
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
147. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), superseded by statute 18 U.S.C.
§ 3121(a).
148. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment
search does not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is
concerned—unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object
of the challenged search, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”)
(internal punctuation and italics omitted).
149. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-43 (1988) (no one has an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed at the curb for pick-up);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (a homeowner does not have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in what can be seen from public airspace into the fenced-in
backyard within the curtilage of a home).
150. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (describing the standard
to measure the effective assistance of counsel for purposes of the Sixth Amendment Counsel
Clause: “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.”); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (“This is a
regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may well be premised on the
theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an
innocent act. They are highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous than the
narcotics involved in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 [(1922)], where a defendant
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The inquiry required by a mistake-or-law defense is not materially
different. The court would need to decide whether a reasonable person
would have known that the conduct charged against him was a crime. To
answer that question, a court would compare the conduct alleged to be
unlawful against what the law has always recognized as illegal conduct. If
“horse stealing” is a crime, it is not much of a leap to conclude that stealing
a motor vehicle is just another form of thievery. Moreover, the common law
distinction between crimes that are malum in se—offenses that are
inherently evil—and malum prohibitum—offenses deemed an offense only
because a statute so declared—is a useful go-by when making those
judgments.151
There will be close cases, of course. There always are when the law
requires a line to be drawn. But a fine line is just that: fine, not invisible.
Judges should be confident that they will be able to identify reasonable legal
mistakes with the same degree of objectivity and skill that they already
display when defining the reasonableness of factual mistakes.

was convicted of sale of narcotics against his claim that he did not know the drugs were
covered by a federal act.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2015).
151 See Larkin, Strict Liability, supra note 58, at 1093-94 (“Indeed, it is fair to say that
many regulatory statutes are categorically different from criminal laws. The latter
altogether forbid identified types of actually or potentially harmful or dangerous conduct,
while the former allow certain types of such conduct to occur in limited amounts, at
particular times, or by certain parties. The environmental laws, for example, allow
manufacturers to discharge certain pollutants into the air, water, or land so long as a
responsible party has a permit for that activity and does not exceed the maximum authorized
amount each period. By contrast, no one can obtain a permit to commit a bank robbery, and
there is no maximum number of burglaries that a person can commit during a calendar year.
If pollution is unavoidable and generating X amount of it can be and is expressly permitted,
we cannot persuasively argue that pollution is as morally wrong as murder, rape, or robbery
and that the criminal law must treat each harm as seriously as it treats these. Moreover, given
that generating X amount of pollution is lawful, it is difficult to argue that X + Y always and
everywhere is clearly wrongful, particularly when Y is small, when it is unduly onerous (or
expensive) to identify precisely the exact difference between those two outputs (and their
effect), or when it is equally difficult to know exactly when someone crosses the line between
them. The result is that the average person would not necessarily know that the actus reus-or ‘guilty act’--element of a regulatory offense is a crime. If you also consider that the subject
matter being regulated is one requiring specialized scientific or technical knowledge in order
to understand the process at issue or the difference between outputs X and X + Y, the
likelihood could approach a certainty that eliminating a mens rea element would result in the
conviction of a morally innocent party.”) (footnotes omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Some hoary criminal law maxims still are sensible today. The
presumption of knowledge of the criminal law, however, is not one of them.
No one can know everything, and the larger and more complicated a
subject matter becomes, the smaller will be the number of people who
understand it. No criminal justice system worthy of that name can demand
more knowledge of the penal law than what can be expected of the average
person. The existence of the necessity and duress defenses proves that the
criminal law accepts the reality that average individuals will break the law
because they lack the fearless honesty of George Washington or selfsacrificing character of Sydney Carton. If so, the criminal law should also
accept the reality that that the average person has less knowledge of the law
than William Blackstone. Honesty and humility demand at least that much.

